During the early morning hours of 2 March 2002, US Central Command initiated the largest US ground assault since DESERT STORM. . .
Less than a month earlier, Captain Edward J. Lengel, a flight commander and HH-60G PAVEHAWK instructor pilot assigned to the 66th Rescue Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nevada deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In late February, 2002 he was assigned to the forward operating location at Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan. As “GECKO 11”, HH-60G flight lead, his mission was to provide 24-hour alert for rescue and recovery operations for the area from the Hindu Kush mountains in Northern Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea.
Operation ANACONDA was a large force attack of an Al Qaida stronghold in the Shahi Kowt Valley of Paktia Province in Eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistani Border. The ground attack combined elements of the 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division. Resistance was heavier than expected and U.S. Army aviation units of the 101st Airborne Division in particular, suffered heavy aircraft losses during the battle.
Only a few hours after the attack was initiated, Captain Lengel led his flight of two
HH-60Gs and the remaining US Army attack aircraft based at Kandahar Airfield to a forward area refueling and rearming point (FAARP) approximately 60 miles west of the battle area. Here, all available assets were to be thrown into the battle as the ground element had been heavily engaged during the first hours of fighting. After delivering his attack element to the ground force commander, he refueled his flight and assumed a ground alert posture in order to provide the fastest combat rescue response possible for the engaged ground forces. The FAARP was almost completely unprotected and in hostile territory, literally cut from the side of a hill with several fuel blivets for the helicopters. Due to the limited security force and complete lack of cover and concealment at the FAARP, Captain Lengel initiated force protection measures and briefed attack response plans. Each HH-60 crew consisted of a pilot, copilot, flight engineer, aerial gunner and two pararescuemen (PJs), equipped with M-4 submachine guns, several M-203 grenade launchers, and their personal M-9 automatic pistols. For seven hours, the crewmembers took up positions around the FAARP to provide what protection they could for the life-saving helicopters. The crew took turns monitoring communications on the aircraft SATCOM radios, updating mission planning materials, briefing with other helicopter assets, and attempting to stay warm in the frigid conditions.
Just after sunset, GECKO 11 flight was notified of a request for immediate evacuation of numerous wounded soldiers. Captain Lengel alerted the crew, initiated scramble procedures, and was airborne within 15 minutes of the request. The entire flight was made through hostile territory, using what concealment they could find, while flying directly to the wounded soldiers’ position. Capt Lengel’s fuel computations would prove critical as the landing zone was at the very edge of the HH-60 flight envelope. The high gross weight of the aircraft fully loaded with weapons, fuel, and pararescuemen was simply too heavy to allow a landing at nearly 9000 feet above sea level. He had to balance the competing demands of dumping enough fuel to allow the helicopter to land at such an extreme altitude while ensuring enough fuel remained so that he could get the critically injured soldiers to a suitable medical facility. His calculations showed that using full power available, he would have to dump over 1000 pounds of fuel, nearly a quarter of his total fuel, to be able to pick up the injured troops. He initiated fuel dump and ensured his wingman also dumped the appropriate amount. While performing all these calculations, he continued coordinating with ground forces to get precise coordinates for the landing zone and get updates on the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground.
At the landing zone, firefights were erupting on three sides. The tactical air control party (TACP) in the landing zone reported fire from the north, east and south in the horseshoe shaped valley. Enemy forces still held the high ground after almost 15 hours of fighting. The TACP informed Capt Lengel that fighters were to strike enemy formations on the high ground to the north. After the strike, Captain Lengel made the decision to maneuver for an approach to the landing zone from the southwest to make the best use of terrain for concealment. He would rely on speed and stealth for survival, flying at less than 100 feet above the ground with only starlight for illumination. As they started their final ingress, the flight of F-18 Hornets providing close air support ran low on fuel and handed over the CAS role to an AC-130 Spectre. Captain Lengel passed his route to the Spectre and proceeded inbound entering the intense center of the battle area. He instructed his wingman, GECKO 12, to proceed inbound after a two minute delay to allow him to make a reconnaissance of the area and identify the virtually unmarked landing zone without exposing both aircraft to the expected intense firefight. Captain Lengel flew into the valley observing friendly and enemy units virtually merged in firefights in all quadrants. The aircraft faced barrage fire throughout the valley, but as Captain Lengel flew down the left side of the valley, his flight engineer spotted the landing zone and talked his eyes to the area. The terrain was rugged and sloping throughout. Captain Lengel maneuvered for a landing in the forward area of the landing zone to provide his wingman room to land. He expertly settled the aircraft to the ground as the rotor RPM began to decay even with maximum power applied from the engines. He literally guided the helicopter to a safe landing that was beyond it’s capability. As soon as he touched down, both pararescuemen exited the aircraft and ran to the wounded who were approximately 50 meters away.
At this point, true to form, the enemy troops opened up with all available weapons on the helicopter in the landing zone, small arms, rocket propelled grenades and mortars rounds all fell and exploded within the small area. Several high explosive rounds landed within one rotor disk (50 feet) of the helicopter. Small arms tracer rounds could be seen passing just over the top of the aircraft and landing just in front of the helicopter only feet from Captain Lengel and his crew. Captain Lengel initiated a call for fire from the AC-130 Spectre on station and directed his wingman into the landing zone, counting on the speed of his pararescuemen and the withering fire of the Spectre to keep them alive and able to extract the wounded with limited time on the ground.
As the PJs from the wingman, GECKO 12, exited the aircraft, another burst of small arms and rocket fire impacted near the formation. One of the PJs from GECKO 12 returned fire while running to retrieve the wounded and carry them to the awaiting helicopter. The PJs loaded two stretcher patients and two ambulatory patients onto the Capt Lengel’s aircraft. The weight of the four soldiers would require even greater skill for the takeoff since the power calculations showed the helicopter could not even hover at 10 feet above the ground. Capt Lengel kept the aircraft in ground effect at less than 10 feet as long as possible following a dry streambed until reaching flying airspeed, where he could climb away from the rocks below. Within seconds, Captain Lengel turned the HH-60 back into the fight to add his firepower to that of the Spectre. There, he provided overhead cover for his wingman who was still in the landing zone loading five more critically injured personnel. As soon as the wingman was ready, Captain Lengel directed egress from the landing zone away from the enemy positions and on-going airstrikes.
With the nine soldiers safely on-board, Capt Lengel’s next task was to get them to medical care as quickly as possible. He maneuvered his flight low level through the mountainous terrain while the pararescuemen stabilized and treated the wounded. Several of the wounded were in critical condition with shrapnel wounds to the abdomen and required immediate medical care. Capt Lengel coordinated with command and control to alert the forward area surgical team of inbound wounded to facilitate a smooth transfer to the awaiting C-130. After leading the flight to the transload airfield and offloading the wounded, he directed his crew to do a thorough battle damage check, refuel the helicopters at another hot refuel point, and reestablish their alert posture. When relieved, he led his flight on the two hour sortie back to Kandahar and terminated his nearly 24 hour mission.
Postscript: After 12 hours of crew rest in a tent at Kandahar, Capt Lengel assumed alert again and led GECKO 11 flight on another mission.